The popular notion of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914, as it prepared to embark for France in 1914, is of a small, professional Army comprised of regulars, experienced in practical soldiering from years of warfare throughout the British Empire. While this Army may have experienced hard campaigning in South Africa against the Boers, they had emerged victorious, and these same soldiers were prepared a decade later to take the lessons of that conflict to the European continent to face the Kaiser’s juggernaut at the side of their French allies. What is not as well-known, or at least not much discussed, is the level of effort, both intellectual and organizational, invested during the pre-war years towards determining how the British Army would fight were it ever sent to a European War. Simon Batton’s Futile Exercise? offers a comprehensive review of how the British Army thought about, organized, and trained for large-scale warfare against a European foe. While the results of these efforts did lead to an easy victory at the onset of the Great War, Batton effectively illustrates that the years 1902-1914 can not be said to be marked by a lack of emphasis on preparedness for continental warfare.
Bratton begins his examination immediately at the end of the Boer War with a discussion of the British Army’s attitude toward maneuvers. He concludes that the general impression among the rank and file that there was not much to be learned being “marched hither and yon” while there was some advantage to be gained by senior commanders in dealing with the actual handling of large bodies of troops on actual ground rather than simply during map exercises. The first exercises held after the Boer War, according to Bratton, belied that notion, with umpires noting that the infantrymen who participated “took cover well and showed improvement in both attack and defense” because of lessons learned fighting in South Africa. Supporting arms such as artillery and cavalry did not fare as well in the post-maneuver critiques.
After establishing a baseline for what British annual maneuvers meant for the participants, whether as part of the troops on the line or the commanders leading the opposing forces, Bratton turns his attention to the evolution of the maneuvers between 1904 and 1912. This period coincides with the tenure of Henry Wilson’s tenure as the Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley (1906-1910). Wilson was a proponent of conscription, and preparation for continental warfare, and was increasingly convinced that should the British Army fight on the European mainland it would do so as part of a combined force operating with the French. Students at the staff college incorporated dealing with hypothetical German aggression against Belgian neutrality in their map exercises, and they brought ideas formulated at Camberley to the field when they returned to the operating forces. The lessons from Staff College then permeated annual maneuvers during this period. The presence of senior officers from both Britain and France at each nation’s annual field exercises gave an imprimatur of official doctrine to the idea that the two nations would fight as a combined force in the event of a European war. Bratton discusses these elements in detail. He further examines the role of aviation as aircraft were introduced to a reconnaissance role in the maneuvers of 1912, the impact of rising senior leaders as the annual exercise took on greater and greater importance as the likelihood of a European war increased in the face of rising international tensions such as the Morrocco Crisis. Bratton concludes his analysis with a discussion of the performance of the British Expeditionary Force when it went to war in 1914, comparing the realities of large-scale combat with what planners expected during peacetime exercises.
Futile Exercise is a serious piece of academic work, well-written and well-cited. It is another example of the high standards that Helion and Company upholds when it publishes works of military history. In addition, the book contains some remarkable photos and excellent period illustrations. This book is an important addition to the body of work on World War One scholarship as it goes a long way to explaining the antecedents of the British Force that went to war in 1914.
