Esteemed historian Clay Blair described the airborne operations that comprised part of the Allied assault on Normandy in World War II, as “the stuff of instant legend” in his 1985 masterpiece “Ridgway’s Paratroopers”. Blair’s assessment is accurate as the exploits of the sky soldiers captured the public imagination and their achievements have been discussed in innumerable books and articles and their actions commemorated on film. Much less talked about is how the subsequent Normandy Campaign, dubbed Operation Overlord, affected the use of airborne formations after the initial forced entry operations of 6 June 1944. Author James Daly has corrected this gap in the historiography of airborne forces with his new book “Proposed Airborne Assaults During Operation Overlord: Cancelled Allied Plans in Normandy and Brittany”.
Daly divides his work into three parts, focusing at first on the planning that led to the airborne assaults on D-Day, along with the political battles fought among the high command of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) that determined how airborne forces were to be organized, administered and committed to battle. Parts Two and Three of the book then discuss contemplated airborne operations meant to be conducted in Normandy and Brittany as the campaign unfolded but were dismissed for a variety of reasons. Most casual students of World War Two recognize Operation Neptune as the initial landings in Normandy, comprised of both airborne drops and amphibious landings. More serious aficionados may know names such as Operation Tonga (the 6th Airborne Division’s D-Day mission) and Missions Detroit and Boston as the American parachute drops were named, but what else was envisioned for the allied airborne forces? This is an opportunity to hear in detail for the first time about little-known names such as Operations Wastage, Tuxedo and Wild Oats or the speculated jumps into Brittany known as Beneficiary, Swordhilt and Hand Up.
Daly does an excellent job conveying the sense of urgency, bordering on frenetic activity that accompanied preparing for the follow-on airborne operations considered from mid-June through late July 1944. Unlike the preparation for Operation Neptune, during with planners and commanders had months to prepare, the timelines for the post-Neptune missions were constrained by conditions on the battlefield, the enemy situation was fluid, and often the objectives questionable. Daly quotes the British airborne commander John Frost as recalling the plan for Wild Oats calling for his battalion to drop almost on top of an enemy armor division. All the recollections recall the frustration of planning, resourcing and staging for a proposed combat drop, only for the situation on the ground to change and for the mission to be cancelled. The airborne forces of the allies would not actually drop into battle again until September 1944, during Operation Market Garden.
Daly’s book is an excellent piece of scholarship, and it is crafted to the standard that readers expect from a volume published by Casemate. It contains seven excellent maps, an assortment of black and white photos, useful appendices and a useful set of endnotes along with a bibliography. Thoroughly engrossing and a great addition to the library of anyone interested in the history of airborne forces.
