For casual students of the Second World, when considering the contributions of the United States, the European Theater of Operations is associated with the Army while the Pacific is considered the exclusive domain of the United States Marine Corps. The Marines rightly won a reputation for courage and tenacity fighting their way from Guadalcanal to Okinawa in a series of famed “island hopping” campaigns. However, this interpretation overlooks the significant contribution of the United States Army to the fighting against Japan. Stephen R. Taaffe’s “United States Army Divisions of the Pacific War” provides a counterpoint to the notion that ground combat in the Pacific War was purely a Marine affair.
Taaffe uses a chronological approach to the Pacific War, highlighting the Army Infantry Divisions’ contributions to the fighting first in support of the United States’ strategy to go over to the strategic offensive after the U.S. Navy’s victory at Miday in June 1942. The Japanese adopted a strategy of consolidating their possession of the new territories gained in the preceding six months, while the Americans and their allies began the process of attempting to liberate that territory. The first actions began in the South Pacific, with combat on islands such as Guadalcanal, Buna-Gona and New Georgia. The United States had the operational goal of retaking the Solomon Islands to deny the Japanese access to airfields. While the strategic debates at this time centered around whether to prioritize fighting against Germany or Japan, and operational considerations and interservice rivalry necessitated establishing two areas of operations (the Southwest Pacific Area under General Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific Area of Operations under Admiral Chester Nimitz), Taaffe’s writing focuses on the tactical performance of the infantry divisions tasked with doing the fighting.
Taaffe notes the challenges presented by the terrain, climate and general inaccessibility of the regions where the infantry divisions were called to fight, while at the same time highlighting the training, organizational and equipment challenges the Army needed to overcome to send 1.7 million men thousands of miles overseas to fight a war. He pulls no punches as he discusses early problems with parochialism, not only between the War Department and the Department of the Navy but also between Regular Army officers and the National Guard, as the Army’s mobilization efforts began, and he also highlights areas where initial combat performances did not meet the expectations of leadership. But as the narrative continues and he goes on to discuss the fighting in the Central Pacific, New Guinea and the Philippines, Taaffe ably illustrates that the professionalism, lethality and capability of the US army infantry grew at an exponential rate.
Stephen Taaffe is an experienced military historian and author, who has demonstrated in his previous work that he knows both the campaigns and the personalities involved in the Pacific Theater of Operations. He ably highlights this knowledge in his latest book, which is well-researched and well-cited with endnotes and a bibliography. “United States Army Divisions of the Pacific War” is a worthy addition to the bookshelf of any WWII enthusiast.
