Being there . . . . when scarcely after the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 ending
World War I hostilities with Germany, our country turned diligently to the task of placing our
successfully tested aviation atop anything that floated. Within 14 days of that historic hour,
Admiral Mayo, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, made strong and very comprehensive
recommendations to that end. Defense aviation and ambitious amphibious offensive warfare,
without hesitation or qualification, had to be commingled, he and his subordinates argued. “In
view of the great advantage given to our fleet by an efficient air service,” he insisted to his
superior Navy “brass”, officers of higher rank, “the Navy must be provided with aircraft for
reconnaissance, spotting, carrying torpedoes, anti-submarine patrols and escort duty.” He
concluded, “The American Navy should at this very moment already have two airplane carriers
on duty in each ocean protecting America.” In May of 1919, the then equivalent to the
Department of Defense, the General Board, made a preliminary report, or “Summary”, to
President Woodrow Wilson and Congress that stipulated, “To ensure air supremacy, to enable
the United States Navy to meet on at least equal terms any possible enemy, and to put the
United States in its proper place as a naval power, fleet aviation must be developed to the
fullest possible extent NOW! Aircraft must become an essential, intrinsic arm of the fleet. A
naval air service must be established, accompanying and operating with the fleet in all waters
of the globe.” Thus, the adamant birth of the aircraft carrier concept, although, full truth be
known, Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, U.S. Army, recently returned home from
World War I, had a great deal to do with it. Even though he often pretended to disparage the
U.S. Navy, he emphatically emphasized “an all but fanatical conviction” that America alone had
the air power to have supreme control of world warfare over both land and sea. “In fact, that is
her destiny.” “Billy” Mitchell’s controversial pro-aircraft carrier theory then, but not necessarily
today, qualified him as an oracle on how aviation in general was, and is still today, and the
future, must affect all ground fighting.
AMID “BILLY” MITCHELL’S CONTROVERSIAL HULLABALOOS, ESPECIALLY WHEN U.S. NAVY PLANS
FAILED TO PLACE LONGRANGE AIRCRAFT ON BATTLESHIPS AND CRUISERS, RELAX AND WITNESS
THE BIRTH OF THE FIRST AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIER, THE USS LANGLEY. CONVERTED FROM
A COLLIER, A VESSEL FOR TRANSPORTING COAL AND FITTED WITH A FLYING DECK, SHE HAD A
LONG AND HONORABLE CAREER AFTER HER LAUNCHING IN 1921. HISTORIAN DAVID WINKLER’S
BRILLIANT BIOGRAPHY OF THE LANGLEY IS MORE THAN JUST A STUDY OF HER EARLY
ADOLESCENT YEARS AND SEVERE WORLD WAR II GROWING PAINS. IT IS ONE OF THE MOST
STUNNINGLY COMPREHENSIVE, BRILLIANTLY WRITTEN HISTORIES OF A WAR BOAT, SADLY
SUNK AT GREAT LOSS IN AMERICAN SAILORS DUE TO AN ALLIED UNNECSARRY ERROR IN THE
EARLY STAGES OF THE PACIFIC WAR OFF THE COAST OF JAVA.
Reviewed and highly recommended by Don DeNevi
“AMERICA’S FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER – – USS Langley and the Dawn of U.S. Naval Aviation” by
David F. Winkler. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD; 2024, 374 pages, 6 ¼” x 9 ¼’, hardcover,
$47.50. Visit www.usni.org. eBook edition also available.
Here, in this high valued Naval read, author David Winkier not only considers the post-World
War I debate for procuring carriers, but also the decision to convert the Jupiter, a coal carrying
collier, and the identification of constructor Clayton Simmers as the father of the American
aircraft carrier, not necessarily “Billy” Mitchell, and why. David is particularly knowledgeable,
and obviously mesmerized, by the evolution of the Langley as an experimental ship tied to the
introduction of the new naval doctrine of the mid to late 1930s. Navy brass saw the Langley as
an operational aircraft carrier that would change the way the Navy fought wars at sea. Of
course, it is also a record of the vessel’s service in World War II until the ship’s final posting to
the Asiatic Fleet, when she went to her death on February 27, 1942. Although the Langley had
received several direct bomb hits which crippled her dead in the water, she remained afloat
until the order was finally given to the USS Whipple to torpedo her. During the hours that
followed, Lieutenant Commander Karpe of the Whipple recovered 233 of the Langley crew.
Knowing survivors remained to be rescued, his own ship now loaded with seamen he had spent
an afternoon, evening, and night plucking from the ocean, he felt he had to leave the scene due
to a suspected Japanese submarine contact. Winkler writes, “With heavy heart the Lieutenant
Commander decided that carrying on increasingly risked the lives of his crew, of those they had
just rescued, and his ship. All aboard, most teary-eyed, could hear the feeble cries of those still
in the cold waters, the final sounds of the abandoned sailors fading astern. Some 263 were lost
either during the Langley attack, or her twin, the Pecos, in that same air attack nearby. 137
survivors were picked up. Chapter 16, The Aftermath, was difficult to finish. For this reviewer, it
will be as hard to dim as a scene he still carries since a young teen, and most certainly to his
grave: two American carrier pilots retrieved from the Pacific by Japanese destroyer sailors after
a failed bombing attack. Made somewhat comfortable the rest of the and night, the two at
sunup, hands tied behind their backs, were marched up to the deck where they believed they
would have a Japanese-style breakfast. Instead, facing the rising sun, anchor chains were placed
around their necks, then, without a word, connected together, were shoved overboard. Typing
this, I still need to wipe away a tear or two.
